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ABSTRACT

As the world’s largest emitters and economies, the United States and China play a critical
role in global climate mitigation. Using Putnam’s two-level game showcases how the
domestic political context of each country impacts their international policies. However,
Putnam’s framework does not differentiate between bilateral and multilateral
circumstances. The clarity and concentration of perceived costs and benefits for the
United States and China from climate policies lead to differing outcomes on the
multilateral and bilateral stage. Fear of the free-rider effect makes players assume payoffs
that resemble the Prisoner’s Dilemma during multilateral climate negotiations, whereas
bilateral negotiations usually result in more cooperative outcomes. These contrasting
policy outcomes reflect the hot and cold relationship between the United States and
China. The additional expediency and effectiveness of bilateral agreements suggest that
substantial climate action will likely originate from strong bilateral agreements. In an
optimal scenario, increased U.S.-China climate collaboration translates into a stronger
relationship between the two global superpowers and provides other nations with the
confidence and certainty to invest in abatement in a renewed global climate regime.

Keywords: U.S.-China relations, climate change, multilateral climate policy, bilateral
climate policy
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INTRODUCTION
Climate change poses a large threat to the livelihood of current and future
generations. In September 2013, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
a United Nations-sponsored committee of scientists, reported that—with a low margin of
uncertainty—anthropogenic sources significantly contribute to climate change. 1 Human
activities including burning fossil fuels, raising livestock, and accumulating waste in
landfills emit greenhouse gases (GHGs), such as carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrous oxide, and
methane gas, which trap heat in the Earth’s atmosphere. 2 In the past hundred years, the
Earth’s average temperature has increased by 0.8 degrees Celsius. 3 The global
temperature is currently rising at more than 0.1 degrees Celsius per decade, though
climate scientists and global leaders agree that nations need to curb temperature rise to
less than 2 degrees Celsius in order to avoid a calamitous climate shift. 4
As the Earth’s climate changes, society faces many social, environmental, and
economic challenges. Higher levels of CO2 and particulates deteriorate air quality and
1

Justin Gillis, “U.N. Climate Panel Endorses Ceiling on Global Emissions,” New York Times, September
27, 2013, accessed October 21, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/28/science/global-climatechangereport.html?pagewanted=1.
2
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: Climate Change
2007: Working Group I: The Physical Science Basis,” 2007, accessed on February 2, 2015,
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/spmsspm-human-and.html.
3
“Climate Change: Basic Information,” Environmental Protection Agency, accessed on February 3, 2015,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/basics/.
4
Patrick Lynch, “Secrets from the Past Point to Rapid Climate Change in the Future,” NASA Global
Climate Change, December 15, 2011, accessed on April 20, 2015, http://climate.nasa.gov/news/649/.
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negatively impact public health. Sea level rise and increased extreme weather events
displace populations, creating millions of climate refugees. 5 Higher temperatures have
disturbed ecosystems and stunted agricultural output. In order to address climate change
and its implications, society must collectively decrease its GHG emissions.
The United States and China hold titles as the world’s largest economies and
GHG emitters. Their cumulative emissions make up about half of the world’s CO2
emissions. China surpassed the United States in CO2 emissions in 2006, though the U.S.
carbon footprint per capita is about twice as large. 6,7 China’s rapid industrialization
starting in the 1980s launched the nation into over three decades of economic growth. In
2014, China surpassed the U.S. as the largest economy based on purchasing power
adjusted-GDP. 8 If the United States and China continue operating business as usual and
do not pursue aggressive climate policies to curb emissions, the world could surpass the
threshold of 2 degrees Celsius and experience exponentially higher risk of a global
climate catastrophe. International and domestic efforts by other nations can only make a
marginal impact without the participation, cooperation, and leadership of China and the

5

In 2008, the UN estimated that climate change has displaced about 20 million people and projected the
world will have about 200 million climate refugees by 2050. See Hannah Barnes, “How Many Climate
Migrants Will There Be?” BBC, September 2, 2013, accessed on April 20, 2015,
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-23899195.
6
“China Overtakes U.S. in Greenhouse Gas Emissions,” New York Times, June 20, 2007, accessed on
February 3, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/20/business/worldbusiness/20ihtemit.1.6227564.html?_r=0.
7
Maria Gallucci and Paul Horn, “For U.S. and China, World’s Biggest Climate Polluters, It’s Still Business
as Usual,” Inside Climate News, February 3, 2014, accessed on February 5, 2015,
http://insideclimatenews.org/news/20130129/united-states-china-carbon-greenhouse-gas-emissionsrenewable-energy-coal-plants-pollution-global-warming-climate.
8
Purchasing power adjusted-GDP takes out the impact of foreign exchange rates in measuring economic
output. In terms of real GDP, the U.S. still has a larger economy than China. See “China Surpasses U.S. as
World’s Largest Economy Based on Key Measure,” Reuters, October 8, 2014, accessed on February 5,
2015, http://rt.com/business/194264-china-surpass-us-gdp/.
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United States. Thus, both nations have the unique responsibility to curb their emissions
and lead efforts to combat climate change.
Despite the critical importance of both countries’ ability to act on climate change,
the Chinese and U.S climate agenda face constraints based on their distinct domestic
political atmosphere and on how clear or diffuse they perceive the costs and benefits of
certain climate policies. 9 Contrasting policy outcomes on the multilateral and bilateral
stage capture the mix of friendship and antagonism that has defined the Sino-U.S.
relationship in modern history. Multilateral climate negotiations exhibit tensions within
the U.S.-China relationship. China and the United States have refused to make substantial
commitments on collective climate action, citing each other’s inaction as the rationale for
such policy stalemate. On the bilateral level, the two nations have engaged in a lot of
climate policy collaboration, especially since President Barack Obama took over the
White House in 2009. In November 2014, President Obama and President Xi Jinping
made a historical agreement to reduce their nation-wide GHG emissions, a success that
can be attributed to presidential leadership and changing policy preferences. The
discrepancies between different levels of climate policy offer a unique narrative on the
relationship between the United States and China as well as insights on the domestic
political constraints and motivations of each nation.

9

Climate policies include mitigation and adaptation strategies. Climate mitigation policies attempt to
reduce emissions and curb climate change through improved energy efficiency, increased regulations on
emissions-heavy industries, and renewable energy deployment. Climate adaptation finds strategies for
society to adjust their lifestyle to the changing climate. Adaptation policies include building shore
protection to guard against rising sea levels and developing emergency response plans for the changing
intensity and frequency of extreme weather events. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Climate
Change,” http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/.
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Different theoretical frameworks, including Putnam’s two-level game, Prisoner’s
Dilemma, and the Coordination Game, showcase the contrasting faces of U.S.-China
climate policy. Applying the two-level game framework to climate policy draws out two
key insights. Firstly, domestic landscapes impact international policies more heavily than
the international landscape influences domestic policies. The certainty and clarity of costs
and benefits perceived by policymakers influence how heavily they will advocate for or
against certain climate policies. Secondly, inconsistent policy outcomes between bilateral
and multilateral levels suggest that policymakers view costs and benefits differently
across the two international levels. On the bilateral scale, players assume payoffs shown
in the Coordination Game, but perceive outcomes that reflect the Prisoner’s Dilemma
matrix during multilateral negotiations.
Due to the domestic political environments constraining both the United States
and China, the nations have found bilateral collaboration more politically palatable and
productive than multilateral engagements on climate change. Based on the lack of
movement in multilateral policy, the world will likely see an increased role of bilateral
climate agreements in advancing substantial climate policy. Moving forward, the United
States and China should focus on keeping each other accountable on the bilateral level,
which could build trust between the two nations and pave the way forward for more
multilateral policy in the future. Understanding the complex dynamics between U.S. and
Chinese interactions on climate change informs future expectations for conflict and
collaboration—not only between these two nations, but among countries across the globe.

4
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Other nations watch and take cue from China and the United States as indicators of how
developed and developing nations should address climate change.

5
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CHAPTER ONE:
Theoretical Frameworks for Climate Policy
Three theoretical frameworks help to structure the analysis of U.S.-China climate
policies: Putnam’s two-level game, Prisoner’s Dilemma, and the Coordination Game.
These different approaches are layered and combined in the cost-benefit matrix (see
Figure 3), which captures the interdependent relationship between the United States and
China. This matrix shows how domestic forces and their perception of costs and benefits
influence climate policy.

Putnam’s Two-Level Game
In Robert Putnam’s “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level
Games,” Putnam describes how international policymaking involves both internationallevel and domestic-level groups. Domestic politics can influence international policies
and vice a versa:
At the national level (Level II), domestic groups pursue their interests by
pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power
by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level (Level
I), national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic
pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. 10

10

Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games,” International
Organization, Summer 1988, Vol. 42: 3, pg. 434.
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These two levels are constrained and driven by one another. On Level I, international
negotiators bargain over a tentative agreement that seeks to maximize the win-sets of the
nations they represent. 11 Win-sets refer to a collection of potential international policies
that can gain enough domestic support for “ratification.” 12 Putnam refers to “ratification”
as any decision-making process on Level II required to implement an international
agreement. 13 Large win-sets indicate that domestic players can accept a variety of
policies and increases the chances of overlap with the win-sets of other nations, making
Level I agreement more likely. Small win-sets indicate that domestic policymakers will
approve of a very limited set of policies, raising the barrier to advancing international
policies. Win-sets depend on the preferences of domestic and international players, the
distribution of power among these constituents, and Level II political institutions. After
developing an international agreement, Level I players discuss the terms with their
domestic counterparts in an effort to ratify the treaty. 14 Any internationally binding treaty
needs ratification by the domestic political institution in place. In practice, Level II
interactions usually occur before Level I negotiations, so domestic players set clear
expectations before sending negotiators to the international bargaining table. 15 If the
nations have small win-sets and domestic policy preferences do not overlap, nations are
unlikely to reach an agreement. Thus, Putnam’s two-level game brings attention to the
domestic political landscapes of the nations involved in the international agreement.

11

Putnam, pg. 436.
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
12
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If the Level II political institution of a nation has a high level of autonomy and
practices centralized decision-making, the nation has larger win-sets and is more likely to
reach an international agreement. 16 However, disclosing large win-sets could harm
national interests by decreasing the nation’s bargaining power abroad. 17 Level I
negotiators from other nations can “push around” this country and negotiate policies that
distribute gains at a disadvantage to the nation with the larger win-sets. 18 The risk of
getting short-ended in international agreements incentivizes nations to reduce the
perceived size of their win-sets to bolster bargaining power. Understanding the
perception of policy costs and benefits becomes critical to predicting these win-sets and
policy negotiation behavior.
Putnam also emphasizes that countries may have the incentive to cheat as a
function of the size of their win-sets. Less overlap in ideal outcomes for either nation
increases the chances of defection. Negotiators need to carefully consider domestic-level
interests to minimize defection when striking a deal. Furthermore, Putnam asserts that
“the temptation to defect can be dramatically reduced among players who expect to meet
again.” 19 The increased frequency and certainty of future negotiations keep both parties
accountable to their agreements. Putnam’s two-level game codifies the role of domestic
and international players in forging international agreements, which provides a clear
framework to analyze U.S.-China climate policy.

16

Putnam , pg. 449.
Ibid.
18
Putnam, pg. 440.
19
Ibid.
17
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Prisoner’s Dilemma vs. Coordination Game
As implied in Putnam’s game, the two nations’ domestic political landscape
constrains their climate strategy, both at home and abroad. Game theory models—the
Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Coordination Game—capture different approaches to climate
policy in international negotiations and showcase how China and the United States
operate in an interdependent space, where the other’s decisions will impact expectations
of individual payoffs. 20 Policymakers will hold initial presumptions of payoffs that
influence their decision-making, regardless of whether their payoff expectations and the
reality of policy outcomes align. Under the Prisoner’s Dilemma model (see Figure 1), if
China invests in abatement technologies and the United States does not, policymakers
predict that China will have a lower payoff than the United States. The United States
faces the same outcomes of lower payoffs if the U.S. abates but China does not. Players
can form assumptions that reflect this payoff matrix if they prioritize short-term
economic gain and geopolitical competition. The players may view the economic cost
burdens of abatement more clearly compared to the potential long-term, diffuse benefits
of climate mitigation.

20

Applying game theory models with payoffs and outcomes takes a realist approach to foreign relations,
since the models often define winners and losers. Notably, game theory assumptions of interdependent
behavior also suggest opportunities for international collaboration between two players in order to
maximize payoffs, which give these games a liberal internationalist spin.

9
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Figure 1. Sino-U.S. Climate Policy under the Prisoner’s Dilemma 21
China’s Strategy
Invest in Abatement

Pollute

Invest in Abatement

3,3

1,4

Pollute

4,1

2,2

U.S. Strategy

Each nation expects higher payoffs if asymmetrical abatement occurs (i.e. when one
country invests in abatement and the other does not), suggesting that both nations will
pollute and operate business as usual in Nash Equilibrium. Compared to the Nash
Equilibrium, both countries would be better off if they negotiate an international
agreement to abate. 22 Even if both players initially agree to abate, either side can and will
likely defect if the international agreement is not perfectly enforced, resulting in business
as usual pollution levels. 23 The Prisoner’s Dilemma framework suggests that the United
States and China will continue polluting at increasing levels in a state of Nash
Equilibrium, even though this leads to sub-optimal outcomes for both nations.
In contrast to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Coordination Game presents higher
payoffs when both nations abate compared to results from asymmetrical abatement or
non-abatement (see Figure 2). With these payoff assumptions, neither country has the
incentive to defect from abatement.

21

Stephen DeCanio and Anders Fremstad, “Game Theory and Climate Diplomacy,” Economics for Equity
& Environment, October 2010, pg. 10.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
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Figure 2. Sino-U.S. Climate Policy in a Coordination Game 24
China’s Strategy
Invest in Abatement

Pollute

Invest in Abatement

4,4

1,3

Pollute

3,1

2,2

U.S. Strategy

Assigning higher payoff expectations to collective abatement could suggest that both
nations place a premium on curbing climate change. China and the United States could
recognize the potential harm of collective inaction and expect economic gains from
developing a green economy. 25 Higher payoff expectations can also arise from the
political benefits of collective abatement, such as the increased political capital resulting
from effective U.S.-China leadership and the multiplier effect when other nations follow
suit in mitigation efforts. If these political and environmental benefits are more
concentrated or clear than the short-term economic costs of abatement, then Chinese and
U.S. policy decisions would reflect the Coordination Game. The Coordination Game
framework implies that both nations have equally compelling motivations to invest in
abatement and will likely cooperate on climate mitigation in Nash Equilibrium. The
ability for China and the United States to collaborate on climate mitigation depends on
whether nations subscribe to the assumptions within the Prisoner’s Dilemma or
Coordination Game.
24
25

DeCanio and Fremstad, pg. 13.
Ibid.
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Clarity in Costs and Benefits
The concentration and certainty of costs and benefits influence how the two
players perceive payoffs, which guides climate policy behavior on the unilateral,
bilateral, and multilateral level (see Figure 3). Costs and benefits expectations determine
if China and the United States will operate under a Prisoner’s Dilemma or Coordination
Game framework.
Figure 3. Cost-Benefit Matrix

When both nations recognize certain costs of abatement, neither is incentivized to abate.
When benefits are certain for both nations, both will likely abate. 26 When costs are
certain for the U.S. while benefits are clear for China, China will take abatement action
unilaterally. The opposite occurs if China expects abatement to lead to clear costs and the
26

This model does not explicitly explain policy outcomes if certain climate policies have clear costs and
clear benefits. Instead, the cost-benefit matrix presupposes that players have weighed the costs and benefits
in order to decide which components are most concentrated, clear, and political valuable to act on.
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U.S. expects clear benefits from abatement. Different stakeholders in the policy process
may hold varying priorities. If the political institution separates legislators from the
executive branch, these groups can hold disparate policy preferences. Notably, the
President has a stake in Level I and Level II interactions, since he remains accountable to
his constituents and also sets the foreign policy agenda. Members of opposing political
parties, subject to the influence of distinct interest groups and constituents, also hold
divergent policy preferences. Assumptions of costs and benefits are in the eye of the
beholder, elevating the importance of how political institutions structure policymaking
and engage with the general public. Depending on how much these stakeholders
influence the Level I or Level II process, they can shape policies to match their policy
preferences.
An analysis of the domestic landscape and international dynamics between the
United States and China reveal that both nations held assumptions reflecting the
Prisoner’s Dilemma payoff structure and explain why multilateral negotiations led to the
lack of abatement. In contrast, bilateral agreements presented clear benefits for both
parties, similar to payoffs in the Coordination Game. This framework builds more
complexity to Putnam’s two-level game by distinguishing differences in multilateral and
bilateral interactions. The cost-benefit framework, paired with a set of game theory
concepts, are critical in analyzing U.S. and Chinese policies on a unilateral, bilateral, and
multilateral level.

13
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CHAPTER TWO:
The Domestic Policy Landscape
Based on Putnam’s two-level game, the players within the domestic landscape
determine the political palatability and feasibility of certain international climate policies.
Different domestic political institutions, constituents, and policy preferences motivate
and constrain the United States and China. The domestic policies of each nation display
the political pressures facing policymakers and the perceived concentration or clarity of
costs and benefits to stakeholders. This chapter provides the domestic background
relevant to explore international climate policies of the United States and China.
Specifically, national variables that influence climate policy at home and abroad include:
1) the political institution, 2) the policy preferences of interest groups and policymakers,
3) leadership commitment and influence, and 4) the competition for international
influence and power. An analysis of the motivations behind U.S. and Chinese climate
policy showcase the different political agendas and perceptions of costs and benefits
driving each country.

Drivers of U.S. Climate Policy: Federalism, Partisanship & Leadership
The United States is governed by a democratic federalist government that has
become marred by political partisanship, private interest groups, and divisive state
14
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interests. These factors have concentrated the costs and diluted the benefits of climate
policy for legislators, creating a political environment not conducive to passing
substantive federal climate policy. America’s desire to maintain global leadership and
influence has placed a premium on the use of hard power in the form of economic and
military strength, which further decreases the likelihood of implementing strong climate
policy that could hinder economic growth. The Great Recession elevated the importance
of economic growth as the nation’s top priority. Despite these factors that make
authorizing U.S. climate policy unlikely, changes in presidential leadership have pushed
climate policy to the forefront of the nations’ executive policy agenda, as climate
mitigation remains an inactive topic in Congress.
Under democratic governance, policy preferences of decision-makers in
Washington should reflect public attitude toward climate change. Democratic processes
incentivize policymakers to act in the interest of their constituents, since legislators gain
votes from adequately representing their voter coalitions. Public opinion on climate
change has fluctuated throughout the past two decades. In 2000, the Program on
International Policy Attitudes found that “an overwhelming majority of the U.S. public
embrace[d] the idea of global warming as a real problem that requires action” and
favored the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. 27 The percentage of Americans worried
about climate change dropped dramatically after the 2008 financial crisis—only 36

27

Steven Kull, “Americans on the Global Warming Treaty,” Program on International Policy Attitudes
(PIPA), February 4, 2000.
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percent thought Congress should prioritize protecting the environment. 28 During the
economic recession, people became cautious about imposing costs on industries that
could slow economic recovery. As unemployment rates decreased and the economy
rebounded over time, public opinion started to support an active role of policymakers in
climate mitigation. In 2010, 69 percent of American believed that the United States
should make a “large or medium-scale effort to reduce global warming even if it incurs
large or moderate economic costs.” 29 A majority (62 percent) of Americans also
supported U.S. climate action regardless of other countries’ actions. 30 The American
public’s belief in climate change increased to 66 percent of respondents in 2014,
including 88 percent of Democrats, 59 percent of Independents, and 61 percent of liberal
and moderate Republicans. 31 Voters indicated they are twice as likely “to vote for a
congressional or presidential candidate who strongly supports” climate action. 32 In the
past two years, Americans favored protecting the environment more than developing
energy supplies. 33 The main outlier was conservative Republicans; only 28 percent of

28

Jeffrey M. Jones, “Americans Increasingly Prioritize Economy over Environment,” Gallup, March 17,
2011, accessed November 17, 2013, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1615/environment.aspx.
29
Yale Project on Climate Change and Communication, “American Opinion on Climate Change Warms
Up,” Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies, 2010, accessed on April 15, 2015,
http://environment.yale.edu/climate-communication/article/american-opinion-on-climate-change-warmsup.
30
A. Leiserowitz, et al, “Politics & Global Warming,” Yale University and George Mason University,
Spring 2014, New Haven, CT: Yale Project on Climate Change Communication.
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid.
33
Oil prices have fallen as a result of advancements in hydraulic fracturing to extract natural gas, which
may influence public policy preference toward environmental protection and energy development. The
usual drawbacks of GHG emissions reduction regulations, including higher energy prices, are less salient
since Americans have benefited from lower energy prices overall. See Andrew Dugan, “Americans Choose
the Environment over Energy Development,” Gallup, April 13, 2015, accessed on April 15, 2015,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/182402/americans-choose-environment-energydevelopment.aspx?utm_source=Politics&utm_medium=newsfeed&utm_campaign=tiles.
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conservative Republicans believe that climate change is occurring and a majority of them
indicated a lower likelihood to vote for a candidate with a strong climate policy
platform. 34 These ebbs and flows in public sentiment provide the initial context for U.S.
climate policy.
Despite rising public concern, the issue of climate change has grown increasingly
partisan in Washington, which suggests legislators include additional considerations in
their cost-benefit calculations. Republicans in Congress often deny climate change or any
stringent legislation on emissions reduction, while Democrats usually advocate for
increased regulation. 35 Due to strategic gerrymandering and the current election process,
elected officials have become increasingly radical and less representative of the general
public. In other words, the policy preferences of voters from opposite ends of the
spectrum are usually better represented than those of the general public. Furthermore,
powerful interest groups influence the policymaking process by funding political
campaigns and lobbying. Between 1998 and 2010, the oil and gas industry contributed
$213 million to members of the Republican Party—a figure that far out shadows funding
from environmental groups for political campaigns. 36 Once elected, these policymakers
have an incentive to pass or block legislation based on the interests of their funders in
34

Leiserowitz, “Politics & Global Warming.”
Prominent climate deniers in Congress include Senator Jim Inhofe (R-OK), Senator Lisa Murkowski (RAL), Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY), and Senator Fred Upton (R-MI). Many politicians that deny
climate change chair congressional committees and hold major leadership positions. Senator Jim Inhofe (ROK), head of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, has even denounced climate change as
“the greatest hoax ever perpetrated on the American people.” See Tom McCarthy, “Meet the Republicans
in Congress Who Don’t Believe Climate Change Is Real,” The Guardian, November 17, 2014, accessed on
April 20, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/nov/17/climate-change-denial-scepticismrepublicans-congress.
36
Daniel Weiss, “Anatomy of a Senate Climate Bill Death,” Think Progress, October 12, 2010, accessed
November 22, 2013, http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2010/10/12/206855/anatomy-of-a-senate-climate-billdeath/.
35
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hopes of receiving campaign support in future elections. 37 Even if a majority of the
public wants government action on climate, the increasingly radical Republican leaders in
Congress have successfully blocked many climate policies. The oil and gas industry
alongside other industry interest groups outspent environmental groups by almost eightfold during the legislative battle over the 2009 cap-and-trade bill, formally called the
American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACES). 38
In addition to the partisan divide over climate change, state interests bind
Congress from enacting effective climate policies. In the U.S. federalist system, elected
officials must balance interests of the state and the nation. These interests often come into
conflict in climate policy, since legislation on GHG emissions disproportionately impact
states that rely on emissions-heavy industries. Congressmen and Senators representing
states that depend on fossil fuel extraction—regardless of their political affiliation—often
do not support legislation that imposes additional environmental regulations for fear of
killing jobs and stalling economic growth in their state. Not only do Republican officials
have the prerogative to oppose climate policy, their Democratic counterparts whom
represent coal-reliant states will vote across party lines to protect their state economy.
According to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), reducing GHG emissions
through more stringent regulations on power plants have significant health benefits,

37

Due to the amount of money it takes to run a successful political campaign, many elected officials exhibit
the “never-ending campaign” phenomenon where they do not stop fundraising, which distracts
policymakers from their core legislative responsibilities and can bias their decision-making.
38
Pro-environment groups spent about $22.4 million on federal lobbying efforts, while the oil and gas
industry spent $195 million. See Evan Mackinder, “Pro-Environment Groups Outmatched, Outspent in
Battle over Climate Change Legislation,” OpenSecrets.org, August 23, 2010, accessed on April 22, 2015,
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2010/08/pro-environment-groups-were-outmatc/.
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outweighing costs from 8 to 1 or 12 to 1 by 2030. 39 Every dollar invested could lead to
$7 in health benefits alone. 40 These regulations present clear benefits to the public, yet
the uneven distribution of costs onto coal-heavy states has handicapped Congress from
passing legislation to reduce emission from coal-fired power plants. To policymakers,
increased regulations present concentrated cost in terms of losing political popularity and
votes. Even though environmental regulations would decrease GHG emissions and
mitigate climate change in the long-term, these benefits seem diffusive and not
immediate enough for policymakers to put their careers on the line.
As a result of this domestic political landscape, the United States has not made
great strides in developing recent legislation to further address climate change and
environmental issues. The death of the 2009 cap-and-trade bill revealed large barriers in
authorizing effective climate policy in Congress. 41 The controversial bill would create a
carbon market where firms trade permits to emit. This market-based mechanism
incentivizes firms to invest in abatement technologies and reduce emissions over time at
relatively low compliance costs compared to alternative command-and-control policies.
The bill passed through the House of Representatives on a partisan vote of 219 to 212, 42
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but failed to gather enough support in the Senate, where Democrats did not hold a
supermajority of 60 seats to circumvent the filibuster.
While Congress remains divided over carbon reduction programs like cap-andtrade, policymakers on the Hill have worked on less divisive issues, like clean energy
deployment, energy efficiency, and natural gas development. These policy areas offer
clear avenues for technological advancement, the creation of green jobs, and energy
security. By presenting clear benefits to constituents and the American economy,
politicians worked across partisan lines to push forward these policies. One of the most
significant contributions of Congress in the recent energy policy regime is the promotion
of natural gas extraction. Congress intentionally left many loopholes in legislation to
minimize compliance costs for the natural gas industry. The Halliburton Loophole within
the Safe Drinking Water Act allows drilling firms to not disclose the underground
injection chemicals used during the fracking process. Other loopholes exist in the Clean
Water Act and Clean Air Act. Natural gas emits far less GHG emissions compared to
coal, and the deployment of natural gas has drastically reduced national emissions. 43
Congress also developed tax incentives, including the Federal Renewable Energy
Production Tax Credit (PTC) and the Solar Investment Tax Credit (ITC), to foster a
growing renewable energy industry. 44 The PTC, originally passed as a part of the Energy
Policy Act of 1992, supports the development of renewable energy facilities and has
43
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largely benefited the wind energy sector. 45 Authorized by Congress through the Energy
Policy Act of 2005, the ITC provides a 30 percent tax credit for residential, commercial,
and utility-scale solar systems, which has driven the increased adoption of solar energy
systems, created green jobs, and decreased the cost of solar. 46 In 2013, the U.S. invested
$48.4 billion in the renewable energy sector. 47 Since 2007, U.S. wind power generation
grew by 300 percent, while solar generation increased by 600 percent. 48 The solar energy
industry employed over 140,000 American workers in 2013 with a projected 20 percent
annual increase. 49 Politicians can rally around protecting and promoting the U.S.
renewable industry because of the green jobs and economic opportunities associated with
the development of this sector. Arguably, setting regulations to reduce GHG emissions
also drive innovation, create jobs, and promote energy security. However, the general
public and politicians seem to see this connection as more tenuous compared to directly
promoting the solar and wind industry and investing in the natural gas industry. Policies
in clean energy and natural gas deployment are far more politically palatable than
regulations on GHG emissions, which are often strategically branded as job-killing
45
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policies. Most politicians consider these policies on GHG emissions reduction noxious to
their career. Congress’ choice in policy areas showcases the domestic political constraints
on authorizing direct emissions reduction initiatives like a national cap-and-trade
program.
Besides the role of Congress in developing climate policies, the executive
political leadership sets the policy agenda at home and abroad. President Bill Clinton
(1993-2001), President George W. Bush (2001-2009), and President Barack Obama
(2009 - current) all held distinct climate policy agendas. Prior to Kyoto Protocol
negotiations in 1997, President Clinton expressed that the United States had “a clear
responsibility and a golden opportunity to conquer…the challenge of climate change.” 50
Reducing emissions can “create a wealth of new opportunities for entrepreneurs at home,
uphold [U.S.] leadership abroad, and harness the power of free markets to free [the]
planet from an unacceptable risk.” 51 President Clinton’s rhetoric revealed his support for
U.S. climate action—both unilaterally and in partnership with other nations. For instance,
President Clinton launched a number of voluntary emissions reduction programs for the
utilities, transportation, and construction industries and a $6.3 billion fund to stimulate
energy efficiency practices. 52 He also advocated for a carbon tax, but Congress did not
accept this policy as an economically responsible means to reduce GHG emissions. 53
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In contrast with President Clinton’s advocacy for strong climate policy, President
Bush questioned the certainty of climate science and did not view climate change as an
imminent treat that necessitated U.S. leadership, especially if imposing GHG emissions
regulations could harm the domestic economy. President Bush said that “we do not know
how much our climate could or will change in the future. We do not know how fast the
change will occur, or even how some of our actions could impact it.” 54 In fact, President
Bush supported energy policies that promoted emissions-heavy industries, like coal and
petroleum. Prior to entering the White House, President Bush worked for 11 years in the
oil and gas industry and received $21.3 million from the CEO of Enron, an energy
commodities firm, during his presidential campaign. 55 President Bush’s point of view on
climate change and his close ties to the oil and gas industry explain the lack of climate
mitigation policies during the Bush Administration, reversing much of the progress made
under President Clinton.
Once President Obama came into office in 2009, he made climate change a key
priority for the nation and pledged to reduce U.S. GHG emissions by 17 percent below
2005 levels before 2020. 56 These goals matched with emissions reduction targets outlined
in ACES. Even though President Obama aspired to forward climate mitigation policies,
he inherited a weak economy after the start of the Great Recession and lacked the public
support to prioritize environmental protection over economic development. During his
54
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first term, he chose to focus on the recovering economy and used his political capital to
push through the health care reform. President Obama placed climate policy on the back
burner after the 2009 cap-and-trade bill died in the Senate. After winning his second
presidential election in 2012, President Obama moved full-force on climate policy and
exercised his executive powers to implement emissions regulations. The 2013 Executive
Climate Action Plan outlines clear policy priorities, such as deploying clean energy,
decreasing emissions of the transportation sector, and building stronger infrastructure to
adapt to the impacts of climate change. 57 Besides these domestic efforts, the Obama
Administration emphasized its commitment toward working with developed and
developing nations to act on climate change. 58 At the prompting of President Obama, the
EPA has acted under the auspices of the Clean Air Act to set emissions regulations for
the transportation sector and coal power plants. 59 The EPA and the National highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) have set historically stringent vehicle emissions
standards to reduce about 3.1 million metric tons of carbon emissions within the
transportation industry. 60 Currently, the EPA is finalizing carbon pollution standards for
coal power plants, which aim to reduce emissions by 30 percent of 2005 levels by 2030. 61
President Obama’s ambitious climate agenda suggests that he perceives clear
benefits to advancing climate policy. He believes “there’s no greater threat to [the] planet
than climate change” and hopes to leave a policy legacy within his second presidential
57
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term. 62 The current Republican Congress makes the prospects of authorizing substantial
climate policy grim for the remainder of President Obama’s term. The paralysis in
Congress on climate policy places additional pressure and importance on the executive
branch in developing regulations and international agreements. Legislators and executive
leadership hold different policy preferences, illustrated through the lack of legislation on
emissions reduction and a recent increase in executive action on climate mitigation.

Drivers of China’s Climate Policy: Maintaining Legitimacy as a OneParty State
In contrast to the United States, the Communist Party of China (CPC) governs the
nation in a one-party state, whose sole political agenda focuses on staying in power. With
rising local protests and demands for better environmental protection measures, the CPC
sees clear benefits to improve China’s environment. While China continues to focus on
economic development, the Party’s self-interest has led to the creation of strategic
policies and a national narrative to rebalance the nation’s breakneck growth with
environmental protection. After China’s leadership transition to President Xi Jinping, he
launched policies to achieve the Chinese Dream, a phrase he coined in 2012 to embody
the aspirations of the Chinese people to improve their standard of living and to emulate
China’s intentions of becoming a global superpower. To fulfill the Chinese Dream for the
Chinese people, President Xi hopes to deliver “better education, more stable jobs, better
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income, more reliable social security, medical care of a higher standard, more
comfortable living conditions, and a more beautiful environment.” 63
Similar components that influence U.S. climate policy preferences shape the
CPC’s win-sets and decision on how to act on climate. China’s political structure,
shifting policy preferences in favor of sustainable development, changes in executive
leadership, and the desire to project power overseas have contributed to the nation’s
affinity toward unilateral GHG emissions reduction efforts. 64,65 While these components
accurately explain some motivators for China’s climate action, the foundational driver
that differentiates China from the United States is China’s political system. China
operates under an authoritarian regime subject to different political constraints. The Party
develops policies that promote political stability and has the authority to make national
policy decisions without much pushback from political elites.
More recently, the Chinese people have begun to recognize the value of
ecosystem services and environmental preservation, making poor air quality a source of
social instability. As a result of China’s unsustainable extraction and consumption of
coal, the nation suffers from the consequences of poor air quality. In January 2013, the
concentration of hazardous particles in Beijing’s air exceeded World Health Organization
(WHO) standards by forty times; city residents referred to these conditions as an
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“airpocalypse.” 66 The Asian Development Bank found that “less than 1 percent of
China’s 500 largest cities meet the WHO’s air quality standards.” 67 In 2010, air pollution
caused about 1.2 million premature deaths in China and drove down life expectancy by
5.5 years in Northern China. 68 Poor air quality correlates to a rise in chronic illnesses,
such as asthma and cancer, in both urban and rural populations. These realities leave
many of China’s metropolises unsuitable for living and deter social elites and top talent
from living in these regions. 69 Since air pollution has such visible impacts on public
health in certain parts of China, acting on this salient issue through emissions reduction
programs can drastically improve the quality of life in these areas. Even though the main
motivator for CPC policy has traditionally been fostering economic growth, the Party has
a vested interest in environmental protection to maintain social stability. According to
China’s 2013 State of the Environment report, the Chinese people held over 700
demonstrations about environmental protection. 70 Environmental protests have grown by
29 percent each year from 1966 to 2011, which motivates the CPC to prioritize
environmental protection and rebalance the nation’s breakneck economic growth. 71 By
implementing climate policies and curbing emissions now, the CPC hedges against longterm threats to the regime. While a two-party system in the United States gives political
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elites more leeway to point fingers at the opposition party and use each other as
scapegoats, the Chinese political system has only one-party. If anything goes wrong, the
Chinese people look to the CPC for answers. While the Party can deploy smart repression
tactics, they acknowledge that addressing any potential risks of social unrest will benefit
the Party in the long-term.
After weighing the costs and benefits of climate policy to the regime, the CPC has
implemented aggressive abatement goals. The CPC has set historically ambitious national
targets to reducing energy intensity and carbon intensity in the 11th (2006 – 2010) and
12th (2011 – 2015) Five-Year Plans (FYPs). 72 In the 11th FYP, the government committed
to reduce energy intensity by 20 percent before 2010. 73 The 12th FYP aims to reduce
carbon emissions intensity by 17 percent below 2005 levels by 2020 and to grow nonfossil fuel sources to 11.4 percent of the total energy mix by 2015. 74 A 2013 National
Development and Reform Commission (NRDC) report outlines China’s investments in
GHG emissions reduction programs, including developing clean energy and energy
efficiency technologies, increasing forest carbon sinks, and piloting seven regional
carbon cap-and-trade programs. 75
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Besides bolstering the Party’s legitimacy, climate policy can also strengthen the
Chinese economy and China’s international competitiveness. Then-Premier Wen Jiabao
recognized the synergistic opportunity of economic growth and sustainable development:
“greening of the economy is not a burden on growth; rather, it is an engine that drives
growth and an effective means to achieve sustainable development.” 76 China holds the
title as the world’s largest investor in renewable energy, spending over $56.3 billion in
2014, 77 and retains 24 percent of the world’s renewable energy capacity. 78 As of 2014,
China has over twice as much renewable energy capacity compared to that of the United
States, and more than four times as much capacity compared to Germany and India. 79
Much of this increase in capacity and generation is powered by China’s manufacturing
sector. The Chinese people benefit from additional jobs in the growing renewable energy
sector, which translates to clear advantages for the CPC in supporting the political status
quo. 80
Even if climate policies in China set back the local economy in the short-term, the
CPC has developed smart repression mechanisms to absorb small-scale social tensions.
As China transitions its energy sources to non-fossil fuels, these policies will inevitably
lead to closures of coal power plants and job loss. As an authoritarian government, the
76
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CPC can mollify local unrest over lost jobs through calculated repression and point
toward these policy decisions as necessary actions to improve air quality. In fact, the CPC
ordered the closure of four major coal-fired power plants in Beijing to improve air quality
and intends to replace coal-generated energy with natural gas-generated energy. 81 The
CPC strategically plans to build new power plants farther inland, away from metropolitan
areas. 82 With hindsight of the Tiananmen Massacre and the resulting political damage,
the Party views social unrest in urban areas as less manageable, more visible, and more
threatening to the Party. While the government is in the process of piloting regional
carbon cap-and-trade programs and more directly tackling GHG emissions reduction, the
bulk of policy efforts such as coal plant closures and renewable energy development have
largely focused on improving air quality and not necessarily climate mitigation. 83 The
Chinese people are more likely to protest against public health concerns than worries
about global climate change. Such strategic policies and behaviors reveal that the Party’s
main priority is to maintain legitimacy.
Similar to the United States, China underwent leadership transitions from
President Hu Jintao (2003 - 2012) to President Xi Jinping (2012 - current). In a one-party
system, the Party usually advances policies in a cohesive manner and decision-making
illustrates heavy path dependency. The policy platform of succeeding leaders aligns
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closely with that of prior political elites and builds upon previous policies. In contrast, the
U.S. political structure and two-party system can result in drastic changes in the policy
preferences of political elites across leadership transitions. Consecutive American
presidents held opposing perspectives on climate change that slow downed and even
reversed policies implemented in prior years. Starting in the early 2000s, the CPC built
up momentum to reduce emissions and improve air quality and public health. The Party
continued to pursue these climate policies domestically throughout President Hu and
President Xi’s administrations. 84
Policymakers in either nation face differing costs and benefits, which either
enable or block effective climate action. China’s climate policy is driven by the CPC’s
concern to remain in power, while the United States has more political barriers to
overcome in a democratic, federalist system. The United States has struggled to take
substantial legislative action on climate change due to congressional perceptions of
concentrated costs and diffuse benefits associated with taking climate action. Deadlock in
Congress elevated the role of the executive branch in developing climate policies.
Political factors in China led to the expedient deployment of climate policies, because
these climate policies result in clear benefits for the CPC. These dynamics inform China
and U.S. behavior on the international level, as predicted in Putnam’s two-level game.
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CHAPTER THREE:
The International Policy Landscape
In addition to the importance of domestic-level players, Putnam emphasizes the
role of international negotiators and the international political context. This chapter takes
a thematic look at the Sino-U.S. relationship to understand ongoing power dynamics and
tensions. 85 Since the Reagan Administration, the bilateral relationship has developed a
hot and cold narrative. The two nations can be friends in certain situations and foes in
others. Conflicting interests, the lack of trust, and adverse domestic political
environments characterize the adversarial side of the Sino-U.S. relationship. These
nations are woven from different cloth; different histories have formed contrasting values
that often conflict and result in adversarial behavior. American and Chinese political
ideologies and political systems fundamentally oppose one another. Even though most
political indicators push these two countries apart, realities of their economic
interdependence pull them back together and incentivize strategic cooperation to ensure
mutual growth. According to J. Stapleton Roy, a scholar at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center, neither country hopes to engage in “unchecked strategic rivalry,”
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since it could lead to political and economic instability. 86 Instead, the two nations have
agreed to seek “a stable and sustainable balance between competition and cooperation.” 87
More recently, China and the United States have recognized their overlapping interests in
issues such as energy security, climate change, and nuclear nonproliferation.
Understanding the push and pull dynamics between the United States and China
contextualizes the two nations’ points of view when entering international climate
discussions and the different behavior each nation exhibits on the bilateral and
multilateral policy levels.

The Rise to Global Power
The Korean War, a proxy war in Vietnam, and ideological tensions over Taiwan
fueled intense rivalry between the United States and China before rapprochement in the
1970s. 88 After the Cultural Revolution and Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, China began to
open up to the world under Deng Xiaoping’s growth-focused leadership. Powered by
China’s impressive economic growth, the nation has become a dominant economic,
political, and military force in the East and across the globe. Benefiting from low labor
costs, China held a trade surplus of over $60 billion as of January 2015, marking a record
high in net exports and affirming China’s critical role in supporting global
consumption. 89 China currently makes up 14.3 percent of the world’s GDP. 90
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Conservative estimates project that China will contribute to 28 percent of the global GDP
by 2030. 91 In March 2014, China announced a 12.2 percent increase in its military
budget, which signifies the nation’s intent to hold a strong military presence in the Pacific
region. 92 Nearly a decade before, the CPC coined the term “peaceful rise” to characterize
the nation’s intentions as benign and to ensure that China’s rise to power does not
destabilize or disrupt the region. 93 Increases in military spending do not necessarily
indicate that China has empirical intentions. However, the CPC must balance their
commitment to peaceful development with its priority to maintain sovereignty and
territorial integrity. 94 Challenges to do so—as with territorial disputes over Diaoyu
Islands—have already led to increased regional instability in the Asia-Pacific as well as
growing internal unrest.
While China’s economy has grown exponentially and has caught up to the United
States in terms of purchasing power adjusted-GDP, “parity on paper will not quickly
yield equal influence abroad” and the United States remains the world’s most influential
nation. 95 The United States became a world power in the 20th century, particularly during
and after World War II. The nation developed foreign policies to create a world order
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aligned with American interests and values of freedom and democracy. 96 Due to China’s
rapid rise, the United States has a national interest to increase engagement with China.
However, attempts to project American values on China are bound to lead to points of
contention, as shown through disagreements over Taiwan and human rights issues.
Judging by the mutual benefit of U.S.-China trade as well as the scale of influence both
countries have across the globe, a new Cold War between the United States and China
does not fall under the interest of any nation. Developing and maintaining a strategic
partnership serves as the key to U.S. and Chinese development as well as global stability.

Push Effect: Conflicting Political Values
While the Founding Fathers of the United States envisioned a nation of free and
liberated citizens in a democratic republic, the Communist Party of China developed
political order using communist ideology. Even though the CPC has largely abandoned
its founding communist ideology, the Party’s focus on protecting its legitimacy and
sovereignty often comes into conflict with the U.S. foreign policy agenda. Conflicts over
Taiwan and human rights issues revealed fundamental differences in values between the
two nations and generated distrust and suspicion. The recent rise in nationalism
exacerbates these bilateral disputes. Disregarding their internal contentions with the
Party, the Chinese people largely buy-in to China’s victimization narrative, and resent
America for attempting to suppress China’s rise to global supremacy.
Acknowledging Taiwan’s independence versus the “One China” policy has been a
point of contention between the two nations and fueled growing distrust. Taiwan is
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governed by a democratic republic that aligns with U.S. political ideals. In the past, the
United States dealt arms to Taiwan at great disapproval of the CPC. Chinese leaders
interpreted U.S. behavior as deceitful and attributed it to the U.S. agenda to obstruct the
reunification of China. 97 During the Bush Administration, President Bush viewed China
a “strategic competitor” and tended to deploy hardline strategies to contain China, such as
developing long-range anti- missile systems in response to China’s growing military
power, increasing arms sales to Taiwan, and vowing to “do whatever it takes” to defend
Taiwan from mainland attacks. 98,99 Though President Bush quickly withdrew his
statement about Taiwan and publicly endorsed the “One China” policy, the Bush
Administration did not make U.S.-China cooperation a priority and often fostered a more
adversarial tone. 100 Tensions over Taiwan highlighted fundamental political differences
between China and the United States and raised suspicions toward one another.
The treatment of political dissidents and minority groups in China represents
another point of social and political strain. The regime uses a portfolio of tactics, such as
violence, coercion, and imprisonment, to deter and contain dissidents throughout the
country, which directly opposes American values of free speech and freedom of
expression. The violent suppression of political dissent on June 4th, 1989, demonstrated
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the gap between American values and those of the Party. 101,102 Besides the Tiananmen
Massacre, the Chinese government has deployed oppressive tactics on Tibetans and
Uighurs through denying their religious freedom, which violates the basic human rights
that Americans hold dear. 103 The CPC views these religious gatherings as precursors to
social unrest and separatist movements.
The resurgence of China’s victimization narrative and a new wave of nationalism
exacerbate Sino-U.S. tensions. Many Chinese people believe that foreigners from Japan
and the West have humiliated and victimized their nation in a “Century of
Humiliation.” 104 In light of the Chinese Dream and the perpetuation of this victimization
narrative throughout popular and elite levels, China may interpret any restricting U.S.
foreign policy as a strategic move to stunt and contain China’s growth. 105 This popular
belief generates distrust in Beijing toward American policies, leading to chronic levels of
resentment and suspicion between the two countries. A complex blend of political
disagreements, historical narratives, and competing national interests repel these nations
from each other.

Pull Effect: Interdependence & Overlapping Interests
While the two nations have conflicting values, they undeniably rely on one
another for economic growth and share other overlapping interests. In 2014, the United
101
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States had a trade deficit of over $342 billion with China 106 and remains the largest
importer of Chinese goods. 107 China’s export-led growth needs American consumers.
China purchases U.S. government bonds as a stable investment option, which finances
U.S national debt. 108 China enjoys the benefits of technology transfers from Western
innovators and foreign direct investment from American investors. In 2009, the U.S.China Business Council reported that American firms, like Apple and Nike, invested $3.6
billion in China. 109 These American businesses can access cheap labor markets in China
and keep costs low. 110 Furthermore, many U.S. companies see China as their top growth
market. 111 The American and Chinese economies are intertwined, which incentivizes
collaboration and cooperation for mutual benefit.
According to the Pew Center on Global and Climate Change and Asia Society,
“leaders in both nations have recognized their increasing strategic interdependence and
have effectively collaborated to solve or manage regional and global threats and
106
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challenges.” 112 The two nations began to understand the importance of developing a
strategic partnership and identifying common interests in global issues, such as nuclear
nonproliferation in North Korea and Iran, energy security, and climate change. 113 Unlike
prior administrations that took a fairly hostile approach toward China, the Obama
Administration treated China as a potential partner in tackling global issues instead of an
inevitable adversary. 114 President Obama explicitly placed the Asia-Pacific region as a
high priority on the American foreign policy agenda, which largely focused on the
Middle East under the Bush Administration. President Obama prescribed a “pivot” to
Asia in hopes of rebalancing power in the East and establishing a strong American
presence across Asia. The United States cannot contain China with similar strategies
deployed against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Instead, the United States must
engage and partner with China as an equal. According to Yun Sun, a senior fellow at the
Stimson Center, a global security think tank, “counter to the heated rhetoric over the last
few years, U.S.-China relations show more signs of cooperation than confrontation right
now.” 115 While this brief description of the Sino-American relationship only highlights
moments of tension and friendship, it showcases the complex and often conflicting nature
of their bilateral interaction based on concurrently opposing and overlapping interests.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
Stalemate on the Multilateral Level
Climate change policy captures a unique cross-section within decision-making,
where policymakers must balance political posturing, economic growth, and
environmental integrity. To complicate policymaking further, GHG pollution does not
respect national boundaries, making multilateral collaboration and collective action
critical in tackling the challenge of climate change. 116 Collective climate action would
drastically reduce GHG emissions, slow the increase in atmospheric temperatures, and
hedge against higher abatement costs in the future. 117 However, climate mitigation is a
public good, which creates the issue of free-riding where non-abating nations reap the
same benefits of abatement without bearing any additional costs. If certain nations invest
more in abatement technologies, other countries could free-ride, which deters early
investor nations from making additional investments. 118 These free-riders gain unfair
economic advantages from offering lower prices on the global market at the expense of
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nations that abated. 119 If nations agree to take collective action, parties can defect and
free-ride due to the lack of accountability in non-binding, multilateral agreements. Thus,
nations should develop binding and enforceable multilateral agreements to avoid freeriding. In practice, most climate agreements—assuming the parties even draft up an
agreement—end up as a watered down and toothless version of themselves after the
negotiation process as international delegations fight to maximize their win-sets.
Chinese and U.S. behavior during bilateral and multilateral climate negotiations
embody their nuanced, multifaceted relationship. In Putnam’s two-level game, Putnam
does not explicitly separate multilateral and bilateral levels in his Level I analysis.
However, U.S.-China actions in these two contexts led to divergent policy outcomes. On
a multilateral level, both China and the United States played fairly conservative roles in
climate negotiations, sometimes even blocking progress in climate mitigation
agreements. The complex dynamics on the multilateral scale have produced climate
policy outcomes represented in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In contrast, the two nations
engaged in bilateral collaboration and forwarded joint climate mitigation programs,
suggesting more alignment with the Coordination Game in the bilateral context. These
two opposing policy outcomes exemplify how China and the United States exhibit
difference faces of their complex relationship depending on their assessment of costs and
benefits. Multilateral interactions showcase one face of the U.S.-China relationship—one
of antagonistic competition and short-term geopolitical interests—while bilateral
interactions reflect friendlier, more cooperative tendencies between the two nations.
119
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Analyzing the rhetoric of the Kyoto Protocol negotiations and COP15
demonstrate how domestic political preferences and the lack of trust between the two
nations contributed to small win-sets that lacked enough overlap and blocked effective
collective action on climate change. Both nations found it politically enticing and
strategic to prioritize economic growth over abatement on the multilateral level due to the
risk of free-riding. Thus, both nations’ dominant strategies have been to pollute and not
make notable commitments to emissions reduction on the multilateral stage. Inaction by
the United States and China had profoundly negative consequences on forwarding
international climate policy. When these large players do not support a treaty or
agreement, the agreement loses clout. If the two largest economies and emitters do not
lead global climate mitigation and adaptation efforts, other countries have little incentive
to invest and commit to abatement.

The Kyoto Protocol
In 1992, delegate countries developed and signed the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) with the goal of taking collective action to
curb GHG emissions. 120 The UNFCCC divided developed and developing nations into
Annex I or Non-Annex I nations, respectively. The UNFCCC categorized China as a
Non-Annex I country and the United States as an Annex I nation. Part of the Convention
mandates annual meetings known as Conference of the Parties (COPs) to forward the
global climate policy regime. In 1997, delegate nations met in Kyoto for COP3 and
crafted the Kyoto Protocol—the first international treaty in history focused on decreasing
120
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GHG emissions. The binding agreement committed Annex I signatories to decreasing
emissions by at least 5 percent below 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012. 121,122 The
Kyoto Protocol exempted developing nations from meeting GHG emissions reduction
targets to allow these nations to develop without hindrance from high abatement costs.
The Protocol used the “common but differentiated responsibility” (CBDR) principle to
justify the uneven distribution of climate mitigation and adaptation responsibilities
between developed and developing nations. Industrialized nations polluted freely for
decades after the Industrial Revolution, imposing externalities upon the world’s
environment for which they should compensate. Notably, the impacts of climate change
asymmetrically affected poorer countries more than industrialized nations. Wealthier
nations also had more resources to invest in abatement and greater capacity to absorb the
cost burden of abatement. Currently, 192 nations, including China, have ratified the
Protocol. 123 Even though Vice President Al Gore signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1998, the
U.S. withdrew from the Protocol and refused to ratify it. This withdrawal demonstrated
the influence of domestic political actors, which held unfavorable perceptions of costs
and benefits toward the multilateral climate treaty. 124
121
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Even though a majority of Americans supported the ratification of the Kyoto
Protocol, an uncompromising Senate and a change in executive leadership blocked the
ratification of the Protocol. In 2000, the Program on International Policy Attitudes found
that “an overwhelming majority of the U.S. public embrace[d] the idea of global warming
is a real problem that requires action” and favored the ratification of the Kyoto
Protocol. 125 The lack of public understanding and salience around Kyoto offers an
explanation for the inconsistency in policy preferences between the general public and
the government. Only 7 to 25 percent of the public heard or knew about the ongoing
climate negotiation. 126 Another survey found that the American public held drastic
misperceptions on whether President Bush supported or opposed the Kyoto Protocol.
Respondents’ responses split nearly half-half on whether President Bush supported or
opposed the Protocol, even though President Bush repudiated the agreement. 127 Kyoto’s
lack of saliency and public misperceptions of governmental support undermined the
impact of public opinion as a guiding principle for elected officials.
On Level II of Putnam’s two-level game, domestic players explicitly defined
small win-sets for international negotiators to work with through the Byrd-Hagel
Resolution of 1997. Senate unanimously passed the Byrd-Hagel Resolution to signal that
that legislators would refuse to ratify any international treaty unless the agreement “also
mandate[d] new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas
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emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same compliance period.” 128
Ironically, many of the provisions within the Kyoto Protocol were supported and
promoted by the U.S. delegation while under the Clinton Administration, which
highlights the tensions between the domestic and international levels when they hold
different policy preferences. The inconsistency in policy preferences across presidential
leadership and Congress revealed drawbacks of the American political system on an
international stage. Congress believed that exemption of developing nations, like China,
would “result in serious harm to the United States economy, including significant job
loss, trade disadvantages, [and] increased energy and consumer costs” as U.S. firms face
higher compliance costs and production moves to countries with less stringent
regulations. 129 Studies found that the United States “would have to spend over $400
billion to comply” with the Kyoto Protocol, but would only reap 4 percent of the cost in
monetized benefits. 130,131 The implementation of Kyoto could almost double electricity
prices, impose additional business expenses on the American economy, increase
unemployment by 2.3 million U.S. jobs, and make U.S. firms less competitive compared
to developing countries. 132 Increased unemployment would also lower household income
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by $2,700 and decrease state tax revenues by $93.1 billion.133 In the globalized economy,
mandates to reduce emissions would significantly hinder U.S. economic growth and
weaken the nation’s global influence. 134 The certainty of economic costs made Kyoto
politically unpalatable for policymakers in Congress.
Not only would exempting developing nations from reduction targets harm the
U.S. economy, Congress recognized that “exemption for Developing Country Parties is
inconsistent with the need for global action on climate change and is environmentally
flawed.” 135 Regardless of U.S. abatement efforts, the world cannot curb temperature rise
if China does not reduce emissions, especially since China derives 70 percent of its
energy from coal combustion and makes up about half of the world’s coal
consumption. 136 Complying signatories only produced about 20 percent of the world’s
emissions, so exempting developing nations dramatically decreased the efficacy of the
Kyoto Protocol in cutting emissions and made the benefits diffuse and nearly negligible.
Upon coming into office in 2001, President Bush repudiated the Kyoto Protocol
for similar reasons stated in the Byrd-Hagel Resolution. In a letter from President Bush to
Senator Hagel, he agreed that the Kyoto Protocol would be “unfair” and “ineffective”
because “it exempt[ed] 80 percent of the world,” including China, “from compliance, and
would cause serious harm to the U.S. economy,” especially considering the uncertainty of
climate science. 137 Since aggressive emissions reductions would impose additional costs
133
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on the oil and gas industry, President Bush found the Kyoto Protocol inconsistent with
his energy policy preferences and detrimental to his close relationship with the oil and
gas industry. During his first presidential term, President Bush was hesitant to push
through contentious policies in order to maintain political popularity, particularly catering
to his conservative, pro-industry voter and donor base. President Bush held similar payoff
expectations as the 105th Congress; supporting the Kyoto Protocol had clear, negative
consequences on the U.S. economy and his political career.
Compliance with the Kyoto Protocol would subject the United States to clear and
substantial economic costs, but diffuse and not immediate benefits. As a result of these
potential economic costs—exacerbated by the lack of abatement commitment by China—
politicians in the White House and on the Hill had little incentive to approve policies that
can set back the economy. The United States expected little gains from climate change
mitigation, since the effects of climate change impact developing nations far more than
industrialized ones. As a Non-Annex I nation, China did not need to make any binding
commitments and was able to free-ride as it continued to develop its economy without the
burden of high abatement costs. Since China did not need to abate, the United States
refused to commit to emissions reduction targets. The U.S. and Chinese attitude toward
the Kyoto Protocol represented a Prisoner’s Dilemma, where both players preferred
asymmetrical abatement in hopes of higher economic payoffs. Ultimately, neither player
agreed to binding GHG emissions reductions in the Kyoto Protocol.
While both nations acted in their national interest, their payoff assumptions may
not have included the impact of their inaction on their bilateral relationship or the
47
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multilateral agreement. U.S. behavior throughout Kyoto Protocol negotiations created
tension between the two nations and negatively impacted U.S.-China relations. U.S.
policymakers cited maintaining fair economic competition and gaining early buy-in from
developing countries as key reasons for denying the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. 138
The United States adopted a “we won’t move before China does” stance on collective
climate action, highlighting the interdependency of climate policy on the multilateral
level. 139,140 However, China saw the U.S. requirements of developing nations as a direct
attack and an attempt to stifle their development, which supported China’s victimization
narrative. Chinese officials saw the repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol as a strategic move
by the U.S. to escape the responsibilities it had promised to uphold under the Clinton
Administration and grew the level of distrust between the two nations during the Bush
Era. China believed any substantial efforts made toward collective climate action and
emissions reductions mandate leadership from developed nations. 141
The lack of U.S. leadership at Kyoto decreased the efficacy of the Kyoto Protocol,
creating a self-fulfilling prophecy, and poisoned the atmosphere for future climate
negotiations. 142 Nations bound by Kyoto emit about 20 percent of global emissions and
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compliance would only lower emissions by 0.9 percent. 143 These projections do not meet
the abatement levels necessary to effectively slow rising temperatures. U.S. withdrawal
from Kyoto also led to a political leadership vacuum. While the European Union and
other developed nations pushed forward with Kyoto, the United States has more political
and economic influence across the globe and produces a larger carbon footprint. If the
U.S. invests in abatement, other nations are more likely to follow. Any multilateral
agreement needs the United States as a signatory and supporter to make a substantial
impact on mitigating climate change. Level I outcomes at Kyoto demonstrated the
importance of domestic policy preferences and the interdependency of climate action
between the United States and China. However, the perception of costs and benefits did
not incorporate the impact of their decision on external players and the global climate
regime.

The Copenhagen Accord
Besides the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, discussions that formed the Copenhagen
Accord at COP15 showcased similar dynamics of interdependency between China and
the United States and the critical influence of domestic politics. At the beginning of the
Copenhagen conference, both nations proposed voluntary emissions targets, which set a
hopeful and optimistic tone for COP15. China committed to lowering emissions intensity
by 40 to 45 percent below 2005 levels before 2020. 144 President Hu promoted three key
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guiding principles in taking collective climate action: 1) fulfilling common but
differentiated responsibilities, 2) “achieving mutual benefit and win-win outcomes”
through international climate efforts, and 3) promoting common economic
development. 145 The United States announced its goal of reducing emissions within a
range of 17 percent below 2005 levels by 2020 and 83 percent by 2050. 146 With specific
numbers on the table, climate negotiators had high hopes for COP15 in defining clear
emissions targets. However, increased turbulence and uncertainty within the U.S.
domestic landscape and China’s uncooperative behavior at COP15 led to a weak climate
agreement.
Despite the attendance of over a hundred world leaders in Copenhagen, the
Accord largely depended upon President Obama and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to
broker a climate deal, illustrating Sino-U.S. policy interdependence and elevating both
nations’ role in collective climate action. 147 Compared to the political leadership involved
during the Kyoto negotiations, a different U.S. leader, President Obama, worked with the
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same Chinese players present at Kyoto. While the Kyoto Protocol asked nothing of
China, the nation’s rapid development and rise to power raised expectations at
Copenhagen. President Obama came into Copenhagen pushing for legally binding
emissions targets so long as developing nations agreed to equitable reduction goals. By
proposing policy that ensures participation from developing nations, President Obama
formed win-sets that can gain “ratification” from Level II players. Increased pressure
from their American counterparts and higher expectations placed China on the defensive
at COP15.
Despite President Obama’s initial leadership, the resulting Copenhagen Accord
laid out no mandatory mitigation targets. The Accord requires Annex I nations to selfdetermine and announce national reduction targets for 2020 and asks Non-Annex I
nations to submit action plans for reducing GHG emissions. 148 The less-than-ambitious
Accord showed the limitations of climate change cooperation in the multilateral setting.
Both the U.S. and China pointed at each other to explain the lack of collective action on
climate change. While the U.S. showcased uncooperative conduct and withdrew from the
Kyoto Protocol, China exhibited blocking behavior at COP15 and intended to minimize
the chances of including emissions reduction commitments in a climate deal. Premier
Wen Jiabo sent a vice foreign minister, He Yafei, to represent him at major meetings with
other heads of states. Minister He had little decision-making power relative to the other
participants at the meetings, but had the ability to block potentially harmful
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agreements. 149 Premier Wen’s absence from the final high-level negotiation sessions,
including meetings with President Obama, exemplified China’s uncooperative and even
insulting behavior. 150 At a few points in the negotiation process, Minister He paused the
meeting to call his superiors for consultation on particular components of the Accord,
forcing some of the world’s most powerful heads of states to wait. 151 Not only did China
reject explicit emissions reduction targets, it denied other nations from including targets
in the Accord to preemptively weaken the climate regulation regime. 152 The U.S.
delegation strongly advocated for increased international accountability and verification
of emissions reductions in order to gain congressional support. China strongly opposed
mandatory outside verification and bargained for voluntary compliance to maintain
control on the information leaving the nation. 153
According to Putnam’s two-level game, states with centralized decision-makers
on Level II have larger win-sets, which should lead to higher chances of pushing forward
international agreements. China’s behavior seems incongruent with their ambitious
domestic climate policies. However, China’s focus on economic growth, as emphasized
by President Hu in his opening statement, and on maintaining close control of domestic
processes made Chinese delegates uncooperative in the multilateral context. The CPC did
not want to be held accountable by external parties or to increase the transparency of
central government operations through international verification processes. Since China
149
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already started to address its air quality issue domestically, the nation had little incentive
to bind itself to unnecessary, external obligations. Even though China took unilateral
actions to improve air quality, the nation saw little benefit and high risk to agreeing to
mandatory emissions reduction targets or any external checks.
While Level I players from the United States intended to advance ambitious
climate policies at Copenhagen, the Great Recession exacerbated concerns about
economic recovery and drew energy away from climate negotiations. The post-recession
economy left climate policy relatively low on the U.S. policy agenda for the general
public and for Congress. 154 While President Obama deployed more cooperative
approaches to climate negotiations and toward China compared to the Bush
Administration, the financial crisis took saliency and political momentum away from the
climate issue. 155 Ratifying or supporting an international agreement that could hurt the
job market was considered political suicide for U.S. politicians, especially when public
opinion did not place a premium on environmental protection policy immediately during
the Great Recession.
The poor timing of congressional action on cap-and-trade legislation also posed a
challenge for Level I players from the United States. President Obama faced uncertainty
on how Senate will vote on the cap-and-trade bill that passed through the House of
Representatives. As a result of such uncertainty, Level I negotiators risked proposing
international climate policy too lax to push Congress for ambitious legislative action or
developing an international agreement too aggressive for legislators to accept, which
154
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would receive backlash and end in failure similar to the Kyoto Protocol. 156Even though
President Obama had a lot of momentum coming into COP15, uncertainty about the
passage of ACES through the Senate and the recent recession made it difficult for the
U.S. delegation to make hard promises on abatement.
Domestic constraints and tensions within the Sino-U.S. relationship explicate the
lackluster political outcomes from both Kyoto and Copenhagen. These combination of
barriers showcased clear resemblance between challenges at Kyoto and Copenhagen.
Both nations perceived payoff assumptions in a Prisoner’s Dilemma. The impacts of
lackluster U.S.-China leadership at Copenhagen resonated with those at Kyoto. At
COP15, a climate leadership vacuum induced cautiousness from other nations instead of
collective efforts to curb climate change. 157
These case studies analyze U.S.-China climate policy through the lens of
Putnam’s two-level game. U.S. and Chinese behavior on the multilateral stage
demonstrate that both nations prioritized economic growth over environmental due to the
clarity of costs and diffuseness benefits associated with climate policy. The underlying
geopolitical competition between the United States and China also motivated both
nations to prioritize their economic strength over GHG emissions reductions during these
multilateral negotiations. 158 Since multilateral climate policies depend on the two
nations’ participation and leadership, the global climate regime remains weak. Outcomes
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from the Kyoto and Copenhagen conferences do not legally bind either nation from
abatement and correlate with the Nash Equilibrium in the Prisoner’s Dilemma model.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
Bilateral Collaboration on Climate Change
In Putnam’s two-level game, Putnam does not explicitly differentiate between
bilateral and multilateral negotiations. However, policy outcomes involving China and
the United States on the multilateral stage diverges greatly from those on the bilateral
level. The United States and China have engaged in numerous bilateral programs to
promote climate change adaptation and mitigation, which starkly contrasts with the
stalemate during multilateral climate talks. The friendlier, more collaborative face of the
U.S.-China relationship reveals itself in the bilateral context far more than in a
multilateral environment. Policy outcomes on the bilateral level suggest perceived
payoffs associated with the Coordination Game, instead of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Compared to multilateral agreements, bilateral negotiations allow for more overlapping
win-sets on specific policy areas and drastically reduce the risk of free-riding. More
recently, executive political leadership of both nations have aligned on climate policy
goals and developed closer bilateral ties. Bilateral collaboration serves as a politically
expedient policy vehicle to tackle climate change. In pursuing bilateral policies,
unintended consequences have resulted, including trade disputes and the lack of follow
through on joint programs. With these barriers to collaboration in mind, effective U.S.56
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China climate collaboration can positively impact their bilateral relationship and
influence multilateral climate agreements.

U.S.-China Joint Initiatives
Prior to 2009, China and the United States engaged in a number of small
partnerships to forward mutual energy interests and to reduce GHG emissions. For
instance, the U.S.-China Forum on Environment and Development launched in 1997 and
provided a platform to advance sustainable development and to cooperate on urban air
quality, renewable energy, and rural electrification. 159 The United States and China
created the Ten Year Energy and Environment Cooperation Framework (TYF) in 2008
during an annual Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) meeting. The TYF established five
joint task forces to share best practices and foster innovation regarding clean energy,
energy efficiency, water quality, air pollution, and the transportation sector.

160,161

These

forms of collaboration grew in size and ambitions under President Obama and President
Xi’s leadership.
When President Obama came into office, the number of joint climate programs
with China increased exponentially; 2009 marked the creation of the largest number of
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joint climate and energy initiatives in Sino-U.S. history. President Obama expanded the
SED into the China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in 2009 and
drastically grew the breadth of bilateral cooperation with China. At these S&ED
meetings, China and the United States developed a range of cross-agency programs
designed to foster partnership in tackling climate and energy issues. The 2009
Memorandum of Understanding to Enhance Cooperation on Climate Change, Energy,
and the Environment reaffirmed mutual environmental goals between the U.S.
Department of Energy, the U.S. Department of State, and China’s NRDC. The EPA
partnered with the NRDC in a five-year agreement to address climate adaptation in the
Memorandum of Cooperation to Build Capacity to Address Climate Change. Additional
examples of U.S.-China bilateral climate collaboration developed in 2009 and 2010
include the Renewable Energy Partnership, the Clean Energy Research Center, the
Energy Cooperation Program, and the Renewable Energy Forums. 162 These joint
initiatives promote knowledge and resource sharing among various U.S. and Chinese
agencies to accelerate renewable energy deployment and GHG emissions reductions.
President Xi renewed the momentum for U.S.-China collaboration once he
succeeded President Hu. According to Orville Schell, the director of the Center on U.S.China Relations at the Asia Society, “Xi Jinping is a very tough, muscular, nationalist
leader whose toolbox is taken from earlier Mao periods.” 163 President Xi, the son of a
revolutionary hero, exhibits more bold and confident characteristics compared to the
162
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formal and reserved Hu Jintao. In Xi Jinping’s speech after his leadership appointment,
he stated:
[The Party has the responsibility] to unite and lead people of the entire party…
while accepting the baton of history and continuing to work for realizing the great
revival of the Chinese nation in order to let the Chinese nation stand more firmly
and powerfully among all nations around the world and make a greater
contribution to mankind. 164
This statement captures his ambitious policy agenda and his desire to realize the Chinese
Dream, which includes empowering the Chinese people with higher standards of living
and expanding China’s role as a global superpower. President Xi views climate
leadership as a pathway toward both components of the Chinese Dream. In 2013,
President Xi and President Obama set up the U.S-China Working Group on Climate
Change, which focuses on five initiatives: 1) raising fuel efficiency standards to reduce
heavy duty truck emissions, 2) developing carbon capture technologies, 3) increasing
energy efficiency in buildings, 4) improving audit and reporting for GHG emissions, and
5) promoting smart grid deployment. 165 Notably, this bilateral initiative includes
cooperation on improving reporting processes, even though the two nations disagreed on
the international accountability and voluntary clause at Copenhagen. These initiatives
exhibit the expediency of bilateral engagements as a policy tool for climate action.
Involving two nations has relatively lower transactions costs and allow for both players to
retain more control over shaping the policies.
In June 2013, President Obama and President Xi agreed to collaborate on phasing
out the production and consumption of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) in order to decrease
164
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ozone depletion and to reduce the impacts of climate change. 166 This agreement uses the
framework and guidelines presented in the Montreal Protocol, which has been signed by
every country and successfully helped society phase out other ozone-depleting
substances. 167 President Obama and President Xi hope that U.S.-China joint leadership in
reducing HFC emissions can result in large-scale multilateral efforts to phase out HFCs
from the environment. The United States and China can deploy a similar leadership
strategy for future multilateral negotiations and use bilateral collaboration as the first step
to reach collective action in reducing other GHG emissions. Granted, HFCs only
represent a small portion of GHGs with clear harms on the environment and its phasedown presents less risk in impacting the economy compared to reductions in more
prevalent pollutants. Developing bilateral and multilateral agreements to reduce CO2 or
other common pollutants have proven to be far more politically sensitive and difficult.
At the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in November 2014,
President Obama and President Xi announced a bilateral climate deal targeted toward
GHG emissions reduction. Shifting national interests and more environmentally-focused
political leaders helped broker this deal, alongside months of negotiation prior to
APEC. 168 In this climate deal, the United States pledges to reduce emissions by 26 to 28
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percent below 2005 levels by 2025. 169 Hitting the new climate deal target means the
United States needs to speed up emission reductions by two-fold starting in 2020. 170
China agreed to reach its CO2 emissions peak by 2030 and to grow renewable sources to
at least 20 percent of the nation’s energy mix. 171 Currently, about 10 percent of China’s
energy comes from renewable sources. 172 China will need to add 800 to 1,000 gigawatts
of capacity from renewable sources. 173
On a bilateral level, China and the United States exhibited behaviors suggesting
that decision-makers subscribed to payoffs from the Coordination Game instead of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma. The players perceived higher payoffs from bilateral abatement
compared to asymmetrical abatement. The opposite occurred during multilateral
negotiations, which often ended in stalemate and ineffective policy outcomes. As the
certainty of climate change and its negative impacts increase, these nations have
increased incentives to take part in climate mitigation efforts to avoid climate
catastrophe.
The political will of executive leaders, changing public preferences, and the lower
risk of free-riding also explain why bilateral agreements seem more politically expedient
than multilateral ones. The timing and pace of development in bilateral programs since
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2009 highlight the importance of presidential leadership. President Obama brought the
issue of climate change and engagement with China to the forefront of the national
agenda. Even though domestic politics barred Congress from enacting legislation to
address climate issues, President Obama used his executive powers to push forward
bilateral agreements, acting with less caution and more ambition in his second term.
Partnering directly with China and setting joint emissions reduction goals make it harder
for future administrations to unravel the climate deal for the sake of maintaining political
capital and stable foreign relations. 174 This safety mechanism allows President Obama to
leave a climate legacy. President Xi’s leadership also advanced climate policy. The
ambitious leader wants to present China and the United States as equal partners and assert
a renewed and revitalized image of China. As a nation that feels historically victimized
by the West, partnering on climate policies symbolizes equalization between China and
the United States. At the close of the APEC Summit, President Xi stated that “President
Obama and I believe that when China and the United States work together, we can
become an anchor of world stability and a propeller of world peace.” 175 This statement
illustrates China’s national interest of becoming the next global superpower, but also
highlights the role of U.S. partnership in supporting China’s rise and the impact made by
the two nations. His aspirations for China as a global superpower—a term no longer
strictly characterized by economic strength, but also political influence—motivated
President Xi to push forward a historical climate agreement with the United States.
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Public preferences in both nations demanded increased government action on
climate change and air pollution. As previously discussed in Chapter Three, 69 percent of
Americans surveyed in 2010 believed that the United States should make a “large or
medium-scale effort to reduce global warming even if it incurs large or moderate
economic costs.” 176 The American public’s concern toward climate change grew
dramatically as the U.S. economy recovered after 2008. 177 China’s annual upsurge in
environmental protests and increased international press coverage of poor environmental
conditions further motivated President Xi to forward climate action. Both executive
leaders saw clear benefits in crafting this climate deal, including improving bilateral
relationships, appeasing public desires for government action on climate change, and
leaving a presidential legacy.
Negotiations limited to two nations eliminate the free-rider effect that plagues
multilateral agreements, especially in repeated games when both sides know they will
come into contact again. This mechanism of high-certainty in repeated encounters
encourages both countries to comply with bilateral agreements and are therefore more
likely to agree to terms in the first place. The United States and China have it in their best
interest to hold each other accountable once they agree on a deal to avoid asymmetrical
abatement. The amount of media and political attention this climate deal has received, in
addition to the likelihood of future interactions between the two nations, have created a
176
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high stakes situation to deter defection. If either nation fails to deliver on their promises,
they will suffer the loss of political capital abroad and tarnish the growing trust between
the two nations. Even if the deal holds no legal weight, each nation has an interest in
meeting emissions reduction goals and perceives higher payoffs from investing in
abatement. Changed public preferences, pro-climate policy leaders, and the prospects of
avoiding climate catastrophe cumulate into these higher payoff assumptions, especially
when both nations act together. Partnership between these global leaders are not only
necessary to effectively curbing GHG emissions, U.S.-China collaboration can also lead
to spillover effects on the multilateral stage and encourage more nations to abate.

Challenges & Drawbacks of Bilateral Collaboration
Once Level I players agree on a deal, Putnam emphasizes the need for domestic
political support to endorse and implement any international agreement. While the
climate deal does not mandate formal ratification, its success hinges on congressional
actions. Since the executive branch perceives different risks and benefits compared to
Congress, these two groups hold opposing views on climate action. Many Republican
leaders criticized the agreement for giving China too many concessions and
disproportionately distributing cost burdens, which can harm U.S. growth. House Speaker
John Boehner (R-OH) believes that the climate deal “is yet another sign that the President
intends to double down on his job-crushing policies no matter how devastating the impact
for America’s heartland and the country as a whole.” 178 Senate Majority leader, Mitch
McConnell (R-KY), expressed distress in requiring “the Chinese to do nothing at all for
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16 years, while these carbon emission regulations [create] havoc in [his] state and other
states across the country.” 179 Senator McConnell represents a coal-dependent state and
ran on the platform against the administration’s “war on coal.” He has clear incentives to
speak out against the climate deal that can harm his constituents. This narrative drives the
debate in Congress on how to block federal agencies from acting on certain executive
orders. While the 2014 climate deal is not legally binding, the lack of support from Level
II actors poses many challenges in reaching U.S. emissions targets. Congress has
threatened to delegitimize President Obama’s executive powers through exercising the
power of the purse and blocking the enforcement of federal emissions regulations. The
Republican Congress can hinder the EPA’s ability to regulate GHGs effectively through
funding cuts and set back the nation’s ability to reach these ambitious targets.
While some Republican Party leaders claim the climate deal gives China a free
pass until 2030, the climate agreement actually necessitates China to implement
aggressive policies to peak on carbon emissions by 2030, considering their movement
along the development curve. China has already taken many unilateral steps to curb inner
city pollution and decrease emissions. A 2014 study by the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology found that Chinese emissions can peak between 2025 and 2035 only if the
nation continued to implement stringent emissions reduction measures. 180 The emission
goals between U.S. and China objectively differ because they take the development
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context of each nation into consideration and try to keep cost burdens equitable. China’s
economic prosperity is far more dependent on carbon-intensive processes compared to
that of the United States. 181 The contradiction between Republican rhetoric and the
reality of the climate deal showcase how politically charged and challenging bilateral
cooperation can be in a hostile domestic political environment. In contrast to their
Republican counterparts, Democratic leadership has largely supported the agreement and
considered it the right start to taking climate action. However, Republicans won a
majority in both houses of Congress in 2014 and can drive most of the policy
conversations on the Hill. Opposing reactions to the climate deal reflect the persistent
partisan divide on the climate issue. U.S. political institutions set intentionally high
barriers for authorizing legislation and essentially mandate compromise across party
lines. However, the Founding Fathers did not anticipate this degree of partisanship in
Congress, which has revealed drawbacks and social inefficiencies within the U.S.
political system. Despite the breakthrough of the climate deal between the United States
and China, Level II actors and domestic politics still present a large barrier to achieving
emissions targets. Unlike these partisan conflicts in the United States, China’s one-party
state allows the CPC to dictate policies and bilateral agreements with little public
criticism from party leaders.
Besides challenges facing the most recent climate deal, the lattice of bilateral
initiatives across U.S. and Chinese agencies encounter other barriers to effective
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implementation, including the lack of funding or follow-through and residual mutual
distrust perpetuated by confrontational competition. 182 Both the U.S.-China Clean
Energy Center and the Renewable Energy Partnership created in 2009 used funds from
existing sources with no clear additional forms of financial support. 183 In other words,
more programs are pulling from the same pool of funding, which is not financially
sustainable. These barriers have hindered successful knowledge sharing for renewable
energy development and GHG emissions reductions. In some cases, the down-sizing or
cancellation of certain partnerships by the United States have increased distrust in the
relationship and generated reluctance to develop future climate partnerships. 184 These
implementation issues highlight the impact of political institutions on international
policies. Even though the executive branch pursued certain cooperative initiatives, the
lack of funding appropriated by Congress for these programs can render them ineffective
and harm the U.S.-China relationship.
Adversarial trade practices in the renewable energy industry have grown distrust
and additional barriers to cooperation on clean energy deployment. While both nations
coordinate on renewable energy research and development, they have fought over unfair
competition within the industry. China’s state-sponsored enterprises produced solar
panels and exported them to the U.S. at lower-than-cost prices, which drove many
American firms into bankruptcy and made it difficult for the American manufacturing
industry to compete. In June 2014, the U.S. Commerce Department found that Chinese
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solar panel producers benefited unfairly from government subsidies and were dumping
solar panels into the U.S. market. 185,186 The Commerce Department set duties on Chinese
solar panel imports from 11 percent to 55 percent in attempts to increase the fairness of
international trade. 187 These tariffs may threaten the development of the renewable
energy sector, since they drive up the price of solar panels for American consumers and
companies. Increased prices lowers solar adoption rates and hinders the climate
mitigation agenda. Similar trade tensions occurred regarding the wind turbine industry.
Before 2009, China only allowed domestic wind turbine installations that utilized largely
locally manufactured parts, which restricted many foreign firms from competing in the
growing Chinese market. 188 China opened up the wind turbine market to U.S.
manufacturers after the United States filed a World Trade Organization dispute in 2010
against unfair government subsidization within the industry. 189 Trade disputes in both the
solar and wind industry highlight the nature of the Sino-U.S. relationship as cooperative
competitors. Both nations predict net benefit from engaging in bilateral collaboration on
climate action, but they should recognize how a hostile domestic environment and
adversarial competition could hinder trust-building and block the implementation of
bilateral climate initiatives.
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Why Sino-U.S. Climate Collaboration Matters
Even considering the political restraints and barriers facing bilateral cooperation,
President Obama and President Xi’s commitment to collaborating on climate action
marks a historical turning point in climate policy and has substantial, tactical benefits on
U.S.-China relations and the multilateral climate regime. China and the United States
have conflicted and competed on many social, political, and economic issues, which
created an unlikely environment for strong bilateral Sino-U.S. relations. 190 Climate
collaboration serves as a platform for trust building and can lay the foundation for future
cooperation on other overlapping interests. Wang Tao, a scholar at the CarnegieTsinghua Center for Global Policy, believes that “successful collaboration on energy and
climate matters may hold the key to unlocking the tight knot in wider U.S.-China
diplomatic relations.” 191 Working together on overlapping interests, while holding off on
more sensitive topics like Taiwan, human rights violations, and trade agreements, 192 can
build mutual assurance and increases the likelihood of successful bilateral engagements
in the future.
Not only does the climate deal have immense consequences on the Sino-U.S.
relationship, the leadership shown by both nations affects the multilateral landscape.
During these recent climate negotiations, Secretary of State John Kerry emphasized the
impact that U.S. and Chinese leadership will have on shaping a global climate agreement:
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“I want to underscore that when [China and the United States] make a decision...it ripples
beyond our borders.” 193 Increased bilateral action can influence multilateral action. The
high stakes collaboration between the United States and China symbolize the coming
together of developed and developing nations to work on climate change policy. With
their participation, cooperation, and leadership, other nations have the confidence to
advance more climate policies and develop a stronger global climate regime.
At COP20 in Lima, international negotiators rode the momentum from the recent
U.S.-China climate deal and agreed to shift away from characterizing nations as either
developed or developing in future climate talks when determining abatement
responsibilities. 194 The Lima Call for Climate Action outlined that national reduction
goals should be based on “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities in light of different national circumstances,” including the nation’s capacity
and resources available to implement stringent goals. 195 Nations should share
responsibilities for climate mitigation, but these responsibilities do not depend strictly on
Annex I categorizations as they had before. 20 years after drafting the Kyoto Protocol,

193

Suzanne Goldenberg, “U.S. and China to Extend Cooperation in Effort to Curb Climate Change,” The
Guardian, July 10, 2013, accessed on March 19, 2015,
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/jul/10/america-china-cooperation-reduce-climate-change.
194
Other notable successes at Lima include fundraising for the Green Climate Fund (GCF), a financial
resource to transfer capital from developed to developing nations for climate mitigation and adaptation
programs. The GCF received support from 19 nations, including the United States, Australia, Belgium, and
Peru. Financial pledges exceeded the initial target of $10 billion. See Gwynne Taraska and Jesse Vogel,
“Outcomes of the Lima Climate Negotiations: Essential Steps Toward an International Climate
Agreement,” American Progress, December 18, 2014, accessed on March 20, 2015,
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2014/12/18/103534/outcomes-of-the-lima-climatenegotiations-essential-steps-toward-an-international-climate-agreement/.
195
Michael Jacobs, “Lima Deal Represents a Fundamental Change in Global Climate Regime,” The
Guardian, December 15, 2014, accessed on April 16, 2015,
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/dec/15/lima-deal-represents-a-fundamental-change-inglobal-climate-regime.

70

An Analysis of U.S.-China Climate Policy

developing nations like China and India look very different from their old selves.
According to Christiana Figueres, the Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC, this shift in
perspective “is a very important breakthrough that [will open] the way [toward] a Paris
agreement” at COP21 in 2015. 196 Using the guidelines in the Call for Climate Action,
countries agreed to submit their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs),
or post-2020 emissions reduction goals, in preparation for COP21. 197 Environmentalists
criticized Lima outcomes for allowing nations to decide their own emissions reduction
targets. However, these stakeholders focused on unrealistic expectations of setting
stringent standards immediately and did not acknowledge the long-term impact of such a
narrative shift. 198 The Call for Action symbolically ends the division between developed
and developing nations that has historically created stalemates in past multilateral climate
negotiations. Removing the usual divide between developed and developing nations
could allow additional nations to perceive higher payoffs from collective action than
payoffs from non-abatement or asymmetrical abatement on the multilateral level. This
new approach to multilateral climate agreements can ameliorate past tensions between
the United States and China, and other developed and developing nations. While one
cannot attribute the advancements at Lima completely to the 2014 Sino-U.S. climate deal,
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Matt McGrath, “UN Climate Deal in Peru Ends North-South Split,” BBC, December 14, 2014, accessed
on April 15, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-30473085.
197
In March 2015, the United States submitted its INDCs and plan to reach emissions reduction
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efficiency, and phasing out HFCs. See David Waskow and Kristin Meek, “U.S. Climate Commitment
Should Spur Other Countries to Act,” World Resources Institute, April 1, 2015, accessed April 16, 2015,
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198
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the bilateral agreement surely gave international negotiators the confidence and
encouragement to push the boundaries and status quo of multilateral climate talks.
Until recently, other nations had little confidence in the United States or China for
committing to reduction targets. Rhetoric from President Xi and President Obama
confirm U.S.-China climate leadership moving forward. Leaders from both sides have
expressed explicit interest in leading multilateral climate negotiations in Paris this winter.
In the Joint Press Conference after the climate deal announcement, President Obama
affirmed the two nations’ “special responsibility to lead the global effort against climate
change,” since the two countries have “the world’s two largest economies, energy
consumers and emitters of greenhouse gases.” 199 President Xi announced that the two
leaders “agreed to make sure that international climate change negotiations will reach an
agreement as scheduled at the Paris conference in 2015, and [they] agreed to deepen
practical cooperation on clean energy, environment protection, and other areas.” 200 These
statements express the Chinese and U.S. commitment to taking coordinated leadership on
climate action. Notably, the United States will remain constrained by a Republican
Senate, which suggests that Level I players can only agree to a nonbinding international
accord instead of a treaty at COP21. This restriction continues to illustrate the role of
Level II players and the need to depolarize the increasingly partisan divide over climate
policies in the United States. In the meantime, the executive leadership in both the United

199
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States and China, driven by a more environmentally-conscious public, will endeavor to
lead a new chapter in the global climate regime.
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CONCLUSION
As anthropogenic emissions rise at an unsustainable rate, the Earth’s temperature
increases and the impacts of climate change manifest through rising sea levels and
extreme weather events. The risks of inaction have surmounted and push nations toward
unilateral and collective action. China and the United States hold unique positions to lead
the developed and developing world in mitigating and adapting to climate change. Their
partnership and lack thereof on the bilateral and multilateral scale have immense
influence on the future of the global climate regime. U.S.-China inaction blocks and
deters other nations from engaging in an effective multilateral agreement, while U.S.China climate leadership can shift perceptions around the benefits of cooperative climate
action and create a ripple effect that encourages other nations to invest in abatement.
Sino-U.S. interactions in climate policy reflect the broader relationship between
the two nations: they have an ambiguously interdependent relationship with fluctuating
perceptions of benefit and harm, antagonism and friendship. China and the United States
experienced adversarial encounters in the multilateral context and far friendlier
exchanges on the bilateral level. Putnam’s two-level game and different expectations of
costs and benefits by policymakers reveal why the Sino-U.S. relationship resembled the
Prisoner’s Dilemma payoff matrix on the multilateral scale and the Coordination Game
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payoff matrix in the bilateral context. Assumptions around the clear costs of free-riders
and asymmetrical abatement motivated such blocking behavior during the Kyoto and
Copenhagen negotiations. Changes in executive leadership and their policy preferences
since 2009 dramatically increased opportunities for climate diplomacy, especially on the
bilateral level, and explain the increase in joint government programs. While bilateral
negotiations are more politically expedient among Level I actors, pushback from Level II
actors within the United States emphasize the binding influence that domestic politics and
the political institution have on international climate policy. The cost-benefit matrix
captures a high-level view of these complex dynamics between the United States and
China.
Moving forward, the United States and China should focus on the effective
implementation of domestic emissions reduction programs in order to reach their
abatement goals and to give other nations the confidence to take collective action. Both
nations face implementation barriers. In the United States, the executive branch must
wrestle with an uncooperative and hostile Congress. China’s one-party system excuses
the CPC from these issues, and the Party prioritized environmental protection in its policy
agenda. Despite the national focus on improving China’s environment, the
implementation of emissions reduction policies remains weak due to the principal-agent
issue and the misalignment of central versus local incentives. The Party will struggle to
implement outcome-driven policies. Misaligned incentives and the principal-agent
problem have plagued the Chinese bureaucracy, leading to a disproportionate focus on
policy inputs over outcomes. In spite of these challenges, the recent bilateral agreement
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encourages both nations to hold one another accountable and to support each other in
their abatement targets, since evenly paced abatement benefits both nations. The
implementation process presents an additional opportunity to build mutual trust and to
strengthen the Sino-U.S. relationship.
Sino-U.S. climate collaboration plays a critical role in moving the needle on
climate mitigation and adaptation. Judging by the constructive outcomes from the Lima
conference, China and the United States can foster significant advancements in the global
climate regime during COP21. As Sino-U.S. climate collaboration matures, nations
around the world will begin to change their traditional perceptions around the costs and
benefits of abatement. In an optimal scenario, increased engagement and cooperation
between the United States and China translate into stronger multilateral action and more
stringent emissions reduction policies that contribute to slowing the rise of global
temperatures to below 2 degrees Celsius. Through this climate leadership mechanism,
nations can collectively conserve the Earth’s resources, protect the Planet’s atmosphere,
and invest in the livelihood of future generations.
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“While we may not live to see the full realization of our ambition, we will
have the satisfaction of knowing that the world we leave our children will be
better off for what we did.”

-

Barack Obama, President of the United States (2008 – 2016)
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